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We investigate firm heterogeneity in responses to minimum wage changes leveraging on a 
policy reform in 2012 in Greece that introduced a youth sub-minimum through a sharp 
reduction in the minimum wage that was larger for youth. Using administrative linked 
employer-employee panel data and a difference-in-differences estimator, we find that, although 
wages decreased across all firms following the policy reform, adult wages decreased by more, 
whereas youth wages decreased by less in firms with a higher share of youth in employment. 
We also find that, in these firms, adult employment increased by more, while youth 
employment increased by less or even decreased and that these changes reflected mainly new 
hires rather than job separations. These heterogeneous responses to the change in the minimum 
across firms are not entirely consistent with the competitive model of the labour market. 
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1. Introduction 
There is a vast literature on the employment effects of minimum wages, but the debate among 
economists has not yet been settled (Manning, 2016). In most cases, evidence comes from 
minimum wage increases, as decreases are quite rare. Nevertheless, minimum wage decreases 
may provide an alternative test of the prediction of the competitive labour market model that 
there is a negative relationship between the level of the minimum wage and employment.  
We leverage on the unique case of the drastic reduction of the minimum wage in Greece 
in February 2012 that was larger among youth – the minimum wage decreased by 32% for 
those younger than 25 years and by 22% for those who were 25 years old or older – to examine 
whether employers’ responses to the policy were heterogeneous. We use administrative linked 
employer-employee panel data and a difference-in-differences estimator to identify the short-
run effect of this policy on wages and employment of youth and adults across firms with 
different shares of youth in employment. 
We find that, between December 2011 and December 2012, although wages decreased 
across all firms, adult wages decreased by more, whereas youth wages decreased by less, 
relative to those of adults, in firms with a higher share of youth in employment. We also find 
that, in these firms, adult employment increased by more, whereas youth employment increased 
by less, or even decreased in firms with a sufficiently high share of youth in employment. Our 
results, however, indicate no significant impact of the reform on job separations, or differences 
in job separations across firms with different shares of youth – implying that the changes in 
employment reflect entirely changes in new hires.   
Overall, these results suggest heterogeneous responses to the change in the minimum 
wage across firms that are not entirely consistent with the competitive model of the labour 
market. 
  
2. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The data used in our analysis were drawn from social security records of the Unified 
Social Security Fund (EFKA) that includes the population of employees and employers in 
Greece. Our sample includes all employees in EFKA for whom the last two digits of the social 
security number match a unique randomly selected two-digit number.1 Records for these 
employees and their employers were drawn for every December in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 
 
1 As the number is drawn from the [00, 99] interval, this selection produces a sample that is approximately 1% of 
the total population of wage and salaried employees in EFKA. The two-digit number selected is unknown to us.  
(descriptive statistics for all variables used in our analysis are presented in Tables A.1 and A.2 
in the Appendix). These employees remain in our sample at any given period, provided they 
remain in wage/salaried employment (otherwise they are coded as “not in salaried 
employment”).  
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
 
We estimate the impact of the February 2012 minimum wage decrease in Greece on firms 
and their employees using a differential trend adjusted difference-in-difference (DID) 
empirical strategy that relies on the policy provision stipulating a higher minimum wage 
reduction for individuals younger than 25 years. The first implication of this is that young 
workers may have potentially been more affected by the policy. The second implication is that 
firms with a higher share of employees under 25 years may have also been affected 
disproportionately – either due to differences in the wage elasticity of labour demand2 or due 
to differences in labour supply responses (e.g., higher turnover rates due to higher youth 
turnover).  
We estimate the impact of the reform on employee outcomes using a differential trend 
adjusted DID estimator through the following specification: 
 
∆𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺25𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑆𝑆ℎ25𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1+𝛽𝛽4𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺25𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝛽𝛽5𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑆ℎ25𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1+𝛽𝛽6𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺25𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑆ℎ25𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 
+𝛽𝛽7𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺25𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑆ℎ25𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜷𝜷𝟖𝟖′ 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊,𝒋𝒋𝒋𝒋−𝟏𝟏 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖    (1) 
 
where ∆𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the change in the outcome of employee 𝑖𝑖 in firm 𝑗𝑗 between the initial period, 
𝑡𝑡 − 1, and the following period, 𝑡𝑡; 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 is an indicator taking the value 1 for outcome changes 
between December 2011 and December 2012, and 0 for outcome changes between December 
2010 and December 2011, when no youth minimum wage was in place; 𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺25𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is an indicator 
taking the value 1 if individual 𝑖𝑖 is younger than 25 years in period 𝑡𝑡; 𝑆𝑆ℎ25𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 is the share of 
employees younger than 25 years in firm 𝑗𝑗 in the initial period, 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊,𝒋𝒋𝒋𝒋−𝟏𝟏 is a vector of pre-
treatment individual and firm characteristics, and 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an error term.  
 In the case of firm-level outcomes, the specification we estimate is as follows: 
 
 
2 This follows from the third Hicks-Marshall law of derived demand (Ehrenberg and Smith, 2012), whereby, under 
certain conditions, the larger the share of a factor in production, the higher is its own-wage labour demand 
elasticity.  
∆𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑆𝑆ℎ25𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1+𝛼𝛼3𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑆ℎ25𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜶𝜶𝟒𝟒′ 𝑿𝑿𝒋𝒋𝒋𝒋−𝟏𝟏𝑭𝑭 +𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (2) 
 
where ∆𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹  is the change in the outcome of firm 𝑗𝑗 between the initial period, 𝑡𝑡 − 1, and the 
following period, 𝑡𝑡; 𝑿𝑿𝒋𝒋𝒋𝒋−𝟏𝟏𝑭𝑭  is a vector of pre-treatment firm characteristics, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an error 
term.  
The inclusion of the level of  𝑆𝑆ℎ25𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 among the right-hand side variables of equations 
(1) and (2) controls for heterogeneity in outcome trends, in the absence of the treatment, across 
individuals and firms that differ in the intensity of the treatment received (differential trend 
adjusted DID). The key identifying assumption of this estimator is that differences in trends 
between treatment and control groups, in the absence of the treatment, in the post-treatment 
period are the same as those in the pre-treatment period (see Table A.3 in the Appendix for 
supporting evidence). 
 
4. Results  
 
Table 1 presents our differential trend adjusted DID estimates of the impact of the reform 
between December 2011 and December 2012 on employee and firm outcomes produced by 
estimating equations (1) and (2) respectively. The first column of Table 1 includes results from 
the estimation of equation (1) using as the dependent variable the change in the individual log 
daily wage between December 2011 and December 2012 (December 2010 and December 2011 
for the pre-treatment period) for individuals who were in wage/salaried employment in both 
periods, including those who changed employer.3 Results show that adult wages decreased by 
more in firms with a higher share of youth in total employment in December 2011 (-0.177, p-
value 0.000), but youth wage decreases did not differ significantly across firms with different 
shares of youth.4 Estimates of wage decreases among youth relative to adults suggest that youth 
relative wages decreased in firms with share of youth in employment up to around 18%.5 In 
 
3 In this case, as well as in the results on the probability of moving to another employer in column three of Table 
1, the sample is restricted to individuals who were employed in both periods, and thus results may be subject to 
sample selection. While it is difficult to address this using standard sample selection correction methods, as this 
requires identifying suitable instruments, we have checked whether this is a concern in our case by examining 
whether the treatment is correlated with selection out of our sample (probability that an individual leaves 
wage/salaried employment in the second period, conditional that they are in wage/salaried employment in the 
initial period). Results (available upon request) showed no significant impact of the treatment on the probability 
that an individual leaves wage/salaried employment. 
4 The corresponding figure is 0.056, calculated as -0.177+0.121, with p-value 0.251.  
5 The difference between the marginal effects of the reform on youth and adult wages for firms with shares of 
youth in this range was between -0.044 (p-value of the null that the difference is zero, 0.014), for firms with share 
of youth 0%, and -0.022 (p-value, 0.097), for firms with share of youth 18%. For firms with shares above this 
December 2011, these firms were around 93% of firms in the data, accounting for around 58% 
of total youth employment.  
Results concerning the employment effects of the reform, estimated at the firm-level 
(second panel of Table 1), show that, on average, these were positive across age groups. 
However, whereas effects on adult and total employment (last two columns of Table 1) are 
increasing with the share of youth at the firm, for youth employment the opposite is the case.  
A result of this is that in firms with share of youth in employment higher than 15%, our 
estimates indicate either an insignificant overall effect of the reform on youth employment or 
a negative and significant effect.6 In our data, these firms correspond to around 15% of all firms 
and account for 48% of total youth employment in December 2011. 
We examine further the dynamics underpinning these employment adjustments in the 
second and third columns of Table 1. The second column includes estimates of the impact of 
the reform on the probability of leaving the employer, produced from the estimation of equation 
(1) using as the dependent variable a binary indicator taking the value 1 if an individual 
employed at a given firm in December 2011 is no longer employed at the same firm in 
December 2012 (including both those moving to another employer and those leaving 
wage/salaried employment7) and the value 0 if the individual remains employed in the same 
firm in December 2012. Results suggest no significant change in job separations between 
December 2011 and December 2012 for adults (0.006, p-value 0.413) and for youth (0.006-
0.034=-0.028, p-value 0.204). Moreover, estimates also show no significant differences in the 
effect of the reform on separations of adult and youth employees across firms with different 
shares of youth in employment (adults: 0.055, p-value 0.342; youth: 0.055-0.023=0.032, p-
value 0.601). It follows that the positive employment effect of the reform, as presented in the 
sixth column of Table 1, is driven by an increase in new hires rather than by a decrease in 
separations; while the evidence of larger increases in adult employment and smaller increases 
(in the majority of cases) in youth employment in firms with higher shares of youth (columns 
four and five in Table 1), imply that these firms hired adults at a higher rate than youth.  
 
threshold the effect is statistically insignificant; while it turns positive, but remains insignificant, for firms with 
youth shares above 36%.   
6 Based on estimates in column four of Table 1, marginal effects of the reform on youth employment are positive 
and statistically significant for firms with share of youth in employment below 15% (0.035 at 0%, with p-value 
0.000, and 0.0143 at 15%, with p-value 0.077); they remain positive, but are insignificant for firms with youth 
shares up to 25%; they turn negative, but remain statistically insignificant for firms with youth shares up to 55%; 
and they become negative and statistically significant thereafter (-0.043 at 55%, with p-value 0.098, and -0.11 at 
100%, with p-value 0.024).  
7 This could include a move to unemployment, inactivity, or self (non-salaried) employment.  
The third column presents estimates of the impact of the reform on a subset of 
separations, associated with moving to another job (probability of moving to another 
employer). These estimates were produced through estimating equation (1) using as the 
dependent variable a binary indicator taking the value 1 if an individual, employed at a given 
firm in December 2011, moves to another firm in December 2012, and the value 0 if the 
individual remains employed in the same firm in December 2012. Estimates indicate that 
moves to another employer among adults increased by significantly more in firms with higher 
shares of youth in employment (0.115, p-value 0.042), whereas, for youth, these moves did not 
differ across firms with different shares of youth in employment (0.115-0.167=0.052, p-
value=0.356). Although, we do not know the reasons of job separations, one could make a 
conjecture that the result for adults is more likely to reflect higher quits in firms where adult 
wages decreased by more.  
Overall, observed wage and employment adjustments to the reform do not seem to be 
entirely consistent with a negative relationship between wages and employment, as the 
competitive model of the labour market would predict. This is because, we find that in some 
firms (those with youth share in employment higher than 15%), despite the fact that youth 
wages decreased significantly relative to their pre-reform level,8 youth employment either did 
not change or even decreased. Moreover, this could not be explained in terms of substitution 
of adults for youth, as youth wages, relative to those of adults, either decreased or did not 
change in these firms. Therefore, this seems to be more in line with models of labour markets 
with frictions (Manning, 2016), which predict that, under certain conditions, there can be a 
positive relationship between changes in wages, arising from a change in the minimum wage, 
and changes in employment. Also consistent with this is the finding that in firms with a higher 
share of youth, there were higher decreases in adult wages and higher probability that adult 
employees move to another firm.  
 
5. Conclusion 
We evaluate the short-run impact of a policy reform in 2012 in Greece, where the 
minimum wage was reduced by more for youth, on individual and firm outcomes. Our key 
finding is that, although wage and employment adjustments to the reform suggest a negative 
relationship between wages and total employment at the firm level, this relationship reflects 
 
8 Based on estimates in column one of Table 1, marginal effects of the reform on youth wages for firms in this 
range, are between -0.115 at 15%, with p-value 0.000, and -0.163 at 100%, with p-value 0.000. 
heterogeneous responses across firms that are not entirely consistent with the competitive 


















































Table 1: Differential Trend Adjusted Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Impact of the 
February 2012 Decrease in the Minimum Wage on Employee and Firm Outcomes, Dec 2011-
Dec 2012  
 Employee Outcomes Firm Outcomes 




















Dec 2012     -0.074*** 0.006 0.005      0.026***       0.011***       0.013*** 
(0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
Dec 2012 x 
Younger than 
25 
  -0.036** -0.034 -0.011    
(0.016) (0.023) (0.022)    




    -0.177*** 0.055    0.115**     -0.143***    0.084** 0.062* 
(0.035) (0.058) (0.057) (0.049) (0.038) (0.037) 
Dec 2012 x 
Share of 
Employees 
below 25 x 
Younger than 
25  
   0.121** -0.023   -0.167**    
(0.062) (0.085) (0.081)    
Observations 37559 51050 40237 22392 22392 22392 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses, ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, 
*significant at 10%. In all specifications, the sample is restricted to employees or firms in the private sector and 
the share of employees below 25 is measured as deviation from the average share of employees below 25 in total 
firm employment in 2011. Specifications for employees’ outcomes include controls for employees’ and firms’ 
characteristics, and specifications of firm outcomes include controls for firms’ characteristics, all measured in the 
initial period, but coefficients estimates are not reported. Employee controls include gender, full-time, full daily 
hours schedule, and occupation (1 digit), whereas firm controls include industry (1 digit), region, share of female 
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Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics of Employee and Firm Characteristics in EFKA Data,  
Dec 2011-Dec 2012  
 Employee Characteristics  Firm Characteristics 
 Dec 2011 Dec 2012  Dec 2011 Dec 2012 
Male 0.54 0.54 Share female 0.44 0.46 
(0.50) (0.50) (0.34) (0.33) 
Age 38.61 38.78 Share under 
25 
0.07 0.06 




0.06 0.06 Share full-
time 
0.74 0.71 
(0.25) (0.25) (0.36) (0.37) 
Full-time 
 
0.71 0.62 Number of 
employees 
45.75 50.07 













1332.62 1156.98 Monthly pay 
bill 
72640.84 70320.82 
(997.08) (991.01) (182090.68) (178501.00) 
Monthly 
days of work 













observations 27343 25629 
Number of 
observations 20697 18685 
Notes: Figures are averages with standard deviations in parentheses. All samples are restricted to employees and 



























Table A.2:  Occupation, Industry, and Region Composition in the EFKA Data,  
Dec 2011-Dec 2012 
Occupations Dec 2011 Dec 
2012 
Industry Dec 2011 Dec 
2012 
Region Dec 2011 Dec 2012 









(0.07) (0.07) (0.50) (0.50) 
Professionals 0.07 0.08 Mining, 
energy, and 
water 








0.08 0.09 Manufacturing  0.16 0.16 South Aegean 
 
0.04 0.04 
(0.28) (0.28) (0.37) (0.37) (0.19) (0.19) 
Clerical support 
workers  
0.29 0.30 Construction 0.10 0.08 Crete 0.06 0.06 





















0.05 0.06 Central 
Macedonia 
0.15 0.15 




0.08 0.07 Banking, 
Finance, and 
Insurance 
0.10 0.11 Western 
Macedonia 
0.02 0.02 








0.09 0.10 Epirus 0.02 0.02 
(0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.14) (0.13) 
Elementary 
occupations 
0.19 0.18 Other services 0.07 0.07 Thessaly 0.05 0.05 
(0.39) (0.39)  (0.26) (0.26) (0.21) (0.21) 
Armed forces 0.00 0.01    Ionian Islands 0.02 0.02 
0.00 (0.08)    (0.14) (0.14) 























observations 27343 25629 
Number of 
observations 20697 18685 
Number of 
observations 20697 18685 










Table A.3: Differences in Outcome Trends across Firms with Different Share of Youth, Dec 
2010-Dec 2011  
 Employee Outcomes Firm Outcomes 




















Dec 2011     -0.012***    -0.011** -0.006     0.013**     -0.013***     -0.014*** 
(0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
Dec 2011 x 
Younger than 
25 
-0.001 -0.034 -0.006    
(0.012) (0.023) (0.020)    




0.035 0.084 0.050 0.019 -0.005 0.003 
(0.023) (0.057) (0.052) (0.044) (0.033) (0.034) 
Dec 2011 x 
Share of 
Employees 
below 25 x 
Younger than 
25  
-0.020 -0.048 -0.044    
(0.040) (0.081) (0.075)    
Observations 37559 51050 40237 22392 22392 22392 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses, ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, 
*significant at 10%. In all specifications, the sample is restricted to employees or firms in the private sector. 
Specifications for employees’ outcomes include controls for employees’ and firms’ characteristics, and 
specifications of firm outcomes include controls for firms’ characteristics, all measured in the initial period, but 
coefficients estimates are not reported. Employee controls include gender, full-time, full daily hours schedule, and 
occupation (1 digit), whereas firm controls include industry (1 digit), region, share of female and share of full-
time employees. 
 
 
 
 
